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Blaming the Planner: 
An Alternative Explanation of 
Development Program Failure 
Melvin 1. Dubnick " 
I. THIRD WORLD PLANNING FAILURE 
Since World War Two, much attention has been given to the prob- 
lems of Third World countries and their efforts at reducing the jm- 
poverishment and starvation which result from their social situation. For 
most international and Third World policymakers there has been an 
increasing need for coordinated efforts to facilitate development proces- 
ses. Whether for selfish or altruistic reasons, political actors the world 
over have aided these policymakers in their battle against "backward- 
ness" and the move toward "modernity." The resulting policies have 
been overtly manifested in national development plans and international 
programs for development (e.g., the United Nations' First and Second 
Development Decades, various World Bank-financed projects, etc.). 
The resources assigned to these policies - in mental as well as physical 
and financial terms - have been, to s'ly the least, substantial. 
Despite the impressiveness of such efforts, one must take note of 
the overall fruitlessness of these undertakings. Attempts to reduce un- 
derdevelopment have been consistently frustrated in almost every in- 
stance. Reviewing the judgments of world leaders and planning experts 
on the matter of development policies, one fact becomes evident: 
development policy successes are few and far between. Permeating 
the evaluations is a conviction that international and national develop- 
ment programs have failed to accomplish their intended tasks. Planning, 
the core methodology of most development programs, has been found to 
be ineffective where it was most needed. 
The comments of ~ l ann ing  ,~uthority Albert Waterston are typical. 
For V17aterston it is obvious that Third World development programs in 
general 
are falling short of what is reasonable to expect. The record is so 
poor - it has been worsening in fact - that it has sometimes led to 
Dr. Dubnick is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emporia Kansas 
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disillusionment with planning and the abandonment of plans. . . . 
Indeed, participants in the United Nations Meeting of Experts on 
Administrative Aspects of National Ilevelopment Planning tin 19641 
. . . went so far as to suggest that national development planning 
was in crisis. ' 
Since then the situation did not improve. The literature of planning 
recorded ever more discouragement and failure. While most develop- 
ment pliinning "textbooks" avoided evaluations of actual plan perform- 
ance,' those monographs assessing planning programs offered dismal 
pictures of the results. United Nations documents were most revealing 
in this respect. One well-known UN advisor on planning, Jozef Pajestka 
of Poland, noted that the "experience of developing nations that have 
resorted to planning in recent years revealed that there is a great discrep- 
ancy betwe& plans and achievement." "he U.N. 1970 Report on the 
World Sitzbation was highly critical of Third World development plans 
and planners for their inability to obtain desired objectives. At a 
September 1969 U.N.-sponsored meeting of experts at  Stockholm, top 
planning liuthorities from around the world accused themselves and 
their colleagues of narrowness in approaching the problems of develop- 
ment and of relying too heavily upon rather "simplistic" models. "till 
nnothel- organ of the United Nations stated the problem as follows: 
. . . there is a great dcal of dissatisfi~ction with the results of the 
planning proccss. In some quarters the dissatisfaction has even 
reached the poilit where the value of planning as an instrument of 
cleveloplnent has been cluestioned. '' 
This attitude of failure was 1womoted by the results of the U.N.'s First 
Development Decade which reduced any remaining optimism in the 
late 1950's. 
1 Albert Waterston, Deoc~lol,mci~t Plnirititrg: Lcssorts of Expcriancc (Baltimore: The 
Johns I.Iopkins Press, 1965) ,  p. 4. 
'See for instance, W. Arthur Lewis, Dccclopmcnt Plntlttiiig: The Essentials of 
Economic Policy (Ncw York: Harper ancl How, Publishers, 1966) and Jan Tinbergen, 
Dccclopmctlt Plnni~irlg, trans. N. I). Smith (h-eu- York: World University Library, 
1967 j .  
:' Jozef Pajcstka, "Planning hlethocls and Procedr~res and P1:ln Implementation," in 
Uniteil Kations, Dcpartmcnt of Economic 2nd Social Affairs, Plrrititing nttd Pla r~  Im- 
plcnac,tatntioi~ ( New York: United Nations, 1967 ) ,  p. 2. 
United Nations, Depnrtn>c*iit of Ecclncln~ic and Social Affairs, 1970 Repod on the 
World Sitr~atiot~ ( K c w  York: United Nations, 1971 j .  
" hleetiiig of Experts on Social Policy and Planning, "Social Policy and Planning 
in National llrveloprnent," in  Unitecl Nations, Ucpartmcnt of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Iittcr,lntionnl Socicrl Dc~cloptncitt Rct:irtc. No. 3: Unified Socio-economic 
Dcccloptt~eirt crird Plnnniny; Some Ncw IIorizotas (New York: United Nations, 1971) ,  
11, 4. 
'' Ccntrc for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the United Nations 
Secretariat, "Employment Strategies and Poverty-Reduction Policies of Developing 
Countries: Prol~lerns and Issues in the Light of Experience in Developnlent Planning," 
Jor~rilal of Decc~lopmctrt Planning, .5 (1972), 3-4. 
Failure was admitted not only in official U.N. documents, but also 
in the records of major conferences on development planning. The 
results of one gathei-ing, published in a volume edited by Colin Legum,' 
reflected the feeling of failure that has marked other sources. A World 
Bank official, attending a conference at the University of Sussex in 
Tune 1969, commented that since World War I1 "more than 1200 
development plms have been prepared', over 125 central planning 
offices have been established, about 100 training centers giving courses 
in planning have been cre~lted," and expressed the expectation that 
"planning should have gained in stature i~nd have received n secure 
place of importance in the development sphere." Yet, to his dismay, 
development planners were being culled to Sussex for a conference on 
"The Crisis in Planning." P a r a p h r a s i n g  that writer's lament, sociologist 
and former planner Guy Benveniste noted that "with twenty-five years 
of experience behind them, national planners talk more about failures 
than about successes." !' 
11. BLAMING T H E  VICTIM 
Among development planners there would be little disagreement 
with the concl.usion that planning in the Third World has been a dismal 
failure. Equally common is the verdfct that the primary responsibility 
for these failures rests with the societies for which the plans were de- 
veloped. What one finds, in fact, is an international version of a phe- 
nomenon William Ryan described for welfu1.e policies in the United 
States: a strong tendency on the - part of analysts to "blame the victim." 
Ryan's work focuses 011 what he calls "the ideology of Blaming the 
Victim." Adhering to this ideology, the well intentioned analyst and 
the reformer, seeking to correct obbious rn~~ldistributions and injustices, 
are misled to develop policies which further aggravate the situation. 
Good intentions 'lnd vigorous actions to improve social conditions 
are constantly being crippled, sabotaged, and deflected by insidious 
forces that have already pre-shaped the channels of thought, Be- 
cause tllose who intend good and act with vigor also believe certain 
things to be true 'lbout the poor, the black, and the victimized. And, 
so believing, they are easily ten~pted into accepting the inythology of 
Blilming the Victim. "' 
7 The First U . N .  Dcuclopmcnt Decade and Its Lcssora for the 1970's (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1970 ) . 
b C. J. Martin, "A Conference Yote: Crisis in Planning," lnternatiotaal Development 
Reuicu,  XI ( 1 9 6 9 ) ,  40-41. 
G r ~ y  Benveniste, ?'he Politics of Expcrtisc ( Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1972 ), 
p. 6. 
10 William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Vintage Books, 1971);  also see 
Nathan Caplan and Stephen D. Nelson, "Who's to Blame?Vsychology Today, November 
1974, pp. 99-104. 
Such an ideology seems chnracteristic of those who are concerned 
with thc problems of development policy for the Third World. This 
l~ecomes evident as one peruses the appropriate literature. 
I t  is a simple matter to find references in that literature to the 
obstacles for developme~lt posed by variously described social values 
and norms of the subject societies. This approach contends, for in- 
stance, that the villue system or social structure of the subject society 
is incompatible with that deemed necessary for the success of de- 
velopment policies. " One promineilt advocate of this particular ex- 
planation is David E. Apter. I11 Tlic Politics of Modernization, Apter 
discusses the sul~jects of  "professionalism" and the "ideology of science" 
as these are associated with modenlizing process. He  notes four ideolog- 
ical tendencies relevilnt for that - process: socialism, nationalism, national 
socinlism, and science. The l,lst, science. 
is not merely a stylc of thinking al~out problems, nor is it solely a 
derivation from the functional significance of science in an industri- 
alized world, although this is clearly thc origin of its power. 
Rather, it is the application of rational methods and csperimentalism 
to social affairs. I '  
The role of the ideology of science is manifest in those "professional 
roles and norms" associated with, among others, manpower experts, 
social survey teams, management experts, and planners. I : '  While these 
professionals might exist within a modernizing social system, there are 
limits to their respective. utility in the development process. Apter 
contends that the professional's ideology of science "functions only in 
a period of practical realism, and is ultimately antagonistic to any other 
ideology. . . ." For him the alternative ideologies (nationalism, social- 
ism, and national socialism) are more likely to predominate in the early 
stages of moderniztltio~i. The overall result is a societal context which, 
at least ideologicallv, works against l~rofessional efforts such as develop- 
ment planning. ~ i 1 e  early stages of development call for an emphasis 
on "identity" and "solidarity" fllnctions which act as foundations for 
future collective action. ''Fol. these purposes the ideologies of nation- 
alism, socialism, and possil)ly, nntiontll socialism are more satisfactory 
than thc ideology of science." " 
As this is the case, what roles are played by planners and other 
professionals \vithin the political and idministrati\.e systems during 
thosc early stages of ~nodernization? Which functions do they perfom1 
Frrcl C:.  B ~ ~ r k c ,  "Thc C l ~ l t ~ ~ r n l  Contvxt," ill Bertram Gross, ed., Action Under 
P I N I I I I ~ I L ~ ;  7'hi. (Itri<lo~~cr of l c o ~ ~ o n z i c  D c r c . / ( ~ ~ ~ n r e i ~ t  (New York: McGraw-Hill Rook 
Co., 1967 ?, pp. 68-83, 
"David E. Aptc.~.. Tlic, Politics of Alodert~izlrtiotl (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), 1). 343. 
l q b i d . ,  p. 317. 
'"bid., ~ 1 1 .  328, 343. 
which make them valuable enough to "keep"? For Apter they are "a 
kind of exhibit; they are formally consulted, but their advice is riot 
followed." ' F o r  Benveniste, who regards the planner's primary task 
as the "reduction of uncertainty," '" a number of secondary functions 
are also attributable to them: legitimizing the regime; acting as a 
private staff for the political leaders; and supplying the political leader 
with :I means of obtaining secrecy in policy formulation, thereby en- 
hancing the leader's political power. '; Thus, the ability of professional 
planners to perform functions external to their primary task may give 
them a "place" within the political and/or administrative structures gf 
a develo$ng social system. - Nevertheless, the roles are not of a nature 
that will lead to planning success. This can only occur, according to 
the Apter hypothesis, when societal conditions :iri of the quality which 
permits the dominance of the ideology of science. 
At what point in the modernization sequence does the ideology of 
science becorne possible? When can planners and other professionals 
expect to have some impact relevant to their main task of promoting 
and aiding development? Apter's implied response is that this will 
occur only when societal conditions warrant it, i.e., when the modern- 
izing nation "develops" sufficiently to permit the exercise of the science 
ideology. For this to occur three conditions are deemed necessary: 
first, there must be "a general acceptance of common membership in 
the society, with the result that nationalism has become internalized 
and implicit"; second, "sufficient development has already occurred' so 
that societal dislocations require fine adjustments rather than gross 
'solutions"'; and third, "a consensus prevails about the roles that are 
functional to the continuous process of development." In short, for 
development ~ lanne r s  to have any impact, that is, for them to play an 
effective and- successful role in development processes, development 
must already have taken place to a considerable extent. I "  
When regarded as the primary explanation of planning failure, 
this hypothesis may suggest: first, the planners accept as a "fact of 
life" that conditions necessary for the fulfillment of their primary task 
are absent; and second, that they realize that no professionally sanc- 
tioned (i.e., planning) action they might take or suggest will change the 
situation until the facilita.ting ci~ctlrnstances are present. Thus person- 
ally and procedurally exempt from blame, planners are also personally 
and procedurally impotent to improve the situation vis-a-vis their goals. 
This same argument can be made on the structural as well as 
normative level. Not only can the value environment of planning lead 
to failure, but the stratification and role systems also can impose thern- 
selves as barriers. In a later work (Choice und the Politics of Alloca- 
tion), Apter - accomplishes - such a tr;lnsition between normative and struc- 
1: lbid.,  p. 318. 
10 Benveniste, Chapter Two. 
I '  lbid., Chapter Three. 
1s Apter, Politics of Modernization, p. 344. 
t u r d  levels. Apter does this by positing a correlation between the de- 
gree of development and the needed and present degree of functional 
utility within a population. As development passes from one stage to the 
next (always becoming progressively more and more "modern" at each 
successive stage), so the complexity of the stratification system passes 
-from a rather simple to an increasingly complicated structure. At various 
stages new classes appear and new stratification relationships are 
formed, the most recently developed class tending to dominate and grow 
as time goes on. The normative and structural characteristics of these 
classes vary. As in his exposition of the ideological barriers to profes- 
sionalism, Apter's argument vis-a-vis stratification is that, until the 
correct circumstances arise - that is, until "functional status elites" 
(e.g., professionals) are dominant -there will be little possibility for the 
effective utilization of professional expertise. In summary, where the 
society is sufficiently developed the planner will have the opportunity 
to aid in the development process. Until then, it is implied, the planner 
must fulfill other functions while awaiting his or her moment of truth. l0 
While not oriented to the specific consideration of the role of 
planners and/or other professionals in developing countries, numerous 
analysts besides Apter have commented on the societal prerequisites 
for facilitating development and modernization efforts. Dankwart 
Rustow, among others, has contended that "only societies transformed 
into nations have shown themselves capable of attaining the more ad- 
" 20 vanced forms of modernity. . . . Using this perspective, it is seen 
that the absence of "nationhood" and "national identity" can be regarded 
as crucial barriers to planning effectiveness. Alternative structures and 
attachments (such as tribes, villages, and the like) are not deemed ac- 
ceptable as units within which development and modernization can be 
facilitated. As a type of conventional wisdom within the social and 
political sciences, this attitude is praised by W. W. Rostow, who notes 
that there is "a good deal of sense in the contemporary political scien- 
tist's emphasis on the achievement of an effective sense of nation- 
hood. . . ." Economic progress, he contends, "tends to be relatively 
slow" in those legally defined entities which lack a binding nationalism. 
Under such circumstances the leaders and those who aid them "are 
denied the benefits of popular exhilaration, the sense of momentum, and 
the enlarged flow of tax resources" that seem to follow the presence of 
a greater unity in society. " 
Edward Banfield takes note of another prerequisite for development 
efforts. Modernization, he argues, occurs within the context of corporate 
organization and corporate forms of collective action. Without these 
' 0  David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory 
( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971 ). 
Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967) ,  p. 31. 
21 W.  W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1971) ,  p. 283. 
corporate frameworks the development process - and, supposedly, those 
involved in that process - are fighting a losing war against "backward- 
ness." What is lacking in the "backward7' Italian community which 
Banfield investigated is an "ethos" which permits such corporate forms 
of activity and action to develop. This "ethos" barrier would have to 
be overcome before any effective development policies could be put 
to use or even seriously considered. Banfield's outlook for changing the 
" 
ethos" was not very optimistic. "Changing the ethos, if it could be 
done deliberately, would entail . . . danUers." D 22 In this light, planning 
efforts might seem fruitless. 
At a more general level, there is that school of thought which sees 
the prime deficiency in a society's lack of "institutionalization." De- 
fined in various ways - as change absorbing, " conflict managing, '' 
or valued and stabilizing '' - institutions are regarded by many analysts 
to be key variables which will determine the success or failure of de- 
velopment policies. A lack of such institutions means, according to 
these writers, that a necessary prerequisite for the use of planning ex- 
pertise is missing. 
The political environment within which planners must work also 
seems to have an impact on whether attempts at planning are even 
worthwhile. Besides the contention that weak or nonexistent political 
institutions might render planning a fruitless and frustrating exercise, 
there is the conceptualization that certain types of institutions might 
develop into barriers with which the planner cannot contend. For 
example, what if the role of the political opposition is too powerful? 
Flanning, by its very nature, involves collective choices which will 
benefit some sectors and inevitably present costs to others. To be 
effective, planners must not only attract the attention and commitment 
of important policyrnakers; they must also take account of those whose 
opposition they will arouse. ~ccord ing  to some authorities, this might 
not even involve specific program suggestions. 
As the planning organization gains in prestige, it can less readily 
insulate itself from the needs of the group in power: dissident 
groups are always ready to seize any stick to attack the ruling party 
and the planning group itself. "' 
22 Edward C .  Banfield, The LMoral Basis of cr Bncku;ard Society (New York:  The 
Free Press, 1958), Chapter 9. 
23 5. N.  Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest ond Change (Englewood Cl i f fs ,  N.J.:  
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). 
24 John P. Powelson, Institutions of Economic G T O U : ~ ~ :  A Thconj of  Conflict 
Management (Princeton, N.J . :  Princeton University Press, 1972). 
2Vamuel  P. Huntington, Politiccrl Order in  Chur~ging Societies ( N e w  Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968 ) . 
26 Andrew Watson and Joel B .  Dirlam, "Planning Problems," in Economic Decelop- 
ment: Challenge and Promise, eds. Stephan Spiegelglas and Charles J .  Walsh (Englewood 
Cl i f fs ,  N.J . :  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970 ),  p. 51. 
Planning attempts will likely provoke opposition and political contro- 
versy from non-governing elites. "The mobilization of collectivities to 
exercise power and influence in support of change is likely to result in 
countermobilization to resist change." '' This condition of change, in 
many circumstances, has placed considerable restraints upon the ef- 
fectiveness of planning and planners. With a weak political consensus 
or a low level of legitimacy for governmental decisions, the value of an 
official policy is decreased. These situations cannot be overcome by 
the planners. Therefore, only in a "correct" political atmosphere can 
planning and other development policies succeed. '' 
Still another relevant example of societal factors which tend to 
negate the impact of planning efforts is found in the administrative 
sector of the environment. Administrators, as part of the policymaking 
context of planning and as key actors in the process in their roles as 
implementors, can and do make a difference between planning success 
and failure. In most instances these bureaucrats are pictured as 
creatures" of their societal milieu. Fred Riggs, for instance, sees the 
administrator in the transitional or "prismatic" society as a breeder of 
gross administrative inefficiency who- reflects the "pathological" condi- 
tion of his society. Lucian W. Pye, on the other hand, regards the 
problem as rooted in the administrator's attempts to perform in a manner 
which will keep him above the corruptions of politics. As part of the 
nation's new elite, bureaucrats are among the first exposed to the 
acculturation processes impcsed upon them by the international environ- 
?lent. While their induction into the "modern" world might seem to 
warrant an open-mindedness and a willingness to accept changes, the 
fact is that, according to Pye, "the manner in which the administrators 
are acculturated has left them primarily sensitive to questions of personal 
conduct and not to matters of, policy." For Pye, it is not the 
corruption problem which is salient; rather it is the administrators' 
"compulsive need to seek security and reassurance in their command 
over small details." 'O In either case, the efforts of administrative ex- 
perts to correct this particular source of inefficiency and policy failure 
James R. Scarritt, "Political Development and Culture Change Theory: A Pro- 
positional Synthesis with Application to Africa," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative 
Politics, 3 ( 1972), 21. 
28 This "p~litical system" cause for planning failure is not unique to the Third 
World. Political conflict over planning in France, Yugoslavia and Italy has some- 
what modified the effectiveness of planning in both the West and Communist bloc nations. 
The importance of the political variable has been taken into account in these countries 
and the atmosphere of political conflict is built into the system. The "correct" political 
environment, therefore, is not necessarily devoid of political opposition. See Stephen S. 
Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planr~ing: The French Model (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, 1969); and Beverly Tanner Springer, "Italy and Yugoslavia: A Com- 
parative Analysis of Policy-Making in Economic Planning," unpublished Ph. D. disserta- 
tion, University of Colorado, 1971. 
2'See Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Deceloping Countries: The Theory of  
Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Miiflin Co., 1964), especially Part Three; and 
Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Chapters 15-16. 
seems only to have proven the point that planners and others can do 
little else than wait for the necessary conditions to develop with the 
passing of time. '' 
Each of these arguments rests on widely accepted conceptualiza- 
tions of causeleffect relationships in developing societies. While such 
wide acceptance testifies to the Iogic of "blaming the victim," questions 
can be raised regarding the z~tility and ,validity of these explanations. 
Yet the validity of "victim-centered" explanations need not even be 
brought into question (although they should be) in order for analysts 
to realize that 
(1) these interpretations of why plans fail. are only partial answers 
which, when taken as the sole focus of analyses, will only 
mislead future researchers and reformer-oriented policymakers; 
( 2 )  the logical conclusions one reaches by such explanations tend 
to be those that legitimize all currently dominant institutional 
arrangements outside the subject society, i.e., the planning pro- 
fession, the funding organizations (World Bank, national 
economic assistance programs, etc.), the international system 
and its current inequities, and so forth; and 
( 3 )  these explanations, by absolving the planning professional of 
any blame, reduce the incentives for planners and planner- 
training institutions to adapt and adjust to the needs of partic- 
ular situations. 
In response to these points, there are several directions which 
analysts have taken. Some have turned from "blaming the victim" to 
"blaming the beneficiary," i.e., noting the highly stratified nature of the 
international social system and its tendency to continually perpetuate 
the socioeconomic and political predominance of "advanced" world 
states. " Some have taken this theme and developed it within the con- 
ceptual framework of contemporary Marxist thoight on imperialism. 32 
Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in Frontiers of  
Development Administrution, ed. Fred W .  Riggs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1971 ), p. 58. 
31 See Irving Louis Horowitz, 'I'hree Worlds of Develq,ment: The Theory and 
Practice o f  Inten~ational Stratificatioti, dd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1972).  For a unique and stimulating view based on this perspective, see Denis Goulet, 
The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Deuelopment (New York: 
Atheneum, 1973 ) . 
32 Harry Magdoff, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran and others are leading exponents of 
this view. Typical of this approach is the following statement by Paul A. Baran: 
"What is decisive is that econonlic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly 
inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries . . . . [TI he 
backward world has always represented the indispensable hinterland of the highly de- 
veloped capitalist West." The Political Economq of  Growth (New York: Modem Reader 
Paperbacks, 1957),  pp. 11-12. 
As a welcome modification of the tendency to blame the victims, this 
view offers a fresh perspective that can be of considerable use in devel- 
oping new strategies for increasing development plan success in the 
Third World. Nevertheless, even this explanation falls prey to the 
third point given above; that is, in focussing on the beneficiary of 
planning failures, this explanation absolves the planner expert of any 
blame for the failures. In the balancc of this monograph I will present 
a second alternative to blaming the victim, one which considers the 
source and quality of planner perceptiotls as a possible cause of develop- 
ment planning failure in the Third World. 
111. BLAMING THE PLANNER: THE EXPERT'S IMAGE 
Development plans are human creations, and as such they are 
guided by the "soci~ll values, visions and interests7' of those who com- 
pose them. In almost all cases the "composers" are planner experts - 
professional "policy-recommenders" " commissioned to draw up develop- 
ment plans by those who represent a country's legitimate political rulers. 
In contracting for these experts, Third World leaders are getting more 
than functional expertise; they are also purchasing sets of assumptions 
and notions about what constitutes desirable social conditions for a 
"modern" society and how these are to be attained in a reasonable 
amount of time (if not sooner). These assumptions and notions - 
values and commitments, if you will - are purchased for the subject 
society as a whole and the development policymaking system in 
particular. Should these values and commitments be relevant and 
demonstrate a high utility for the subject society, plans will likely tend 
to be successful; if not, then we have pinpointed one other possible 
source of planning f a1 '1 ure. 
The relationship between plan failure and planner expert values is 
neither often discussed nor well researched. Several comments can be 
found in the general literature of planning related to this topic, 34  but 
generally these are little more than brief commentaries with no substan- 
tial empirical evidence to support them. In this section we will attempt to 
indicate how planner expert values influence planning policy by demon- 
strating the inflexible nature of their value systems in the face of con- 
ditions which demand open and malleable assumptions. 
We begin by developing a framework through which we can 
analyze the expert's value system. For this purpose the concept of the 
"image" (extrapolated from Kenneth Boulding's 1956 work) will. be 
31 See Raymond 4pthorpe, "Developn~rnt Studies and Social Planning," The Journal 
o f  Declclopment Sttidios, 6 ( 1970),  4. 
?+ See Ruth Glass, "The Evaluation of Planning: Some Sociological Considerations," 
Inter~tatic~t~nl Social Sciencc Journccl, 11 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  393-409; also see David C. Ranney, 
Plantring ond Politics in thu Metropolis (Columhns, Ohio. Charles E. Merill Publishing 
Co., 1960), t>specially chapter 2; Apthorpe, 4; and Gunner bfyrdal, Asian Drama: An 
Enqirtry into the Porerty o f  Natiom (London; Penguin Books, 1968). 
used. '' Defined as "subjective knowledge" which is largely responsible 
for an individual's behavior, the image has as its source "all past expe- 
rience of the possessor of the image itself." The image has several 
functions, two of which are relevant at this point. First, it is the 
repository of an individual's values and commitments. Talcott Parsons 
defines a value as an "element of a shared symbolic system which 
serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of 
orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation. . . . " 36 Thus, 
a value is a code or standard which "organizes a system of action." 
Value, conveniently and in accordance with received usage, places 
things, acts, ways of behaving, goals of action on [an] approval- 
disapproval continuum. . . . A calue is n conception, explicit or 
implicit, distinctive of  an individual or characteristic of  u group, of 
the desirable wl~ich influences the selection from available modes, 
means, ant1 ends of action. " 
Functioning as a repository of values, the image takes on a second 
task by acting as a constantly adapting filter for present and future 
actions and experiences. :Ix Viewed within the context of a general 
systems framework, the image is situated between the individual and 
his/her environment. In this location, the image acts as a screen or 
control apparatus through which incoming information is processed 
(or not processed) in accordance with the image's form at the time of 
contact. In its role as a filter, the image can respond to incoming 
messages in three ways: ( I )  not at all, i.e., by rejecting or ignoring 
the input; 3"(2 by accepting the input in some "regular and well- 
defined" way which can lead to a gradual modification of the image 
itself; 40 and (3)  by accepting certain messages which will change the 
" . image in a quite radical way" thus causing an intellectual revolution 
of sorts. 41  
Every image configuration is unique in its response to inputs from 
the environment. The particular form of an image depends on several 
factors, and these manifest themselves in what Boulding calls the "pro- 
cess of testing." This process exposes the image in its current form to 
3Xenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge tn Life and Society (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1956). 
30 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951),  p. 12. 
" Clyde Kluckhohn and others, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of 
Action," in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (editors), Toward a General Theory of 
Action (New York: Harper and How, Publishers, 1951), p. 395 (emphasis in original). 
3"oulding, The Image, pp. 5-6. 
30 Ibid., p. 7; see also Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construc- 
tion of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knouledge (New York: Anchor Books, 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966),  p. 44; and Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dis- 
sonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1957), p. 3. 
40 Boulding, The Image, pp. 7-8. 
4 1  Ibid., pp. 8-10; see also Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
"reality" (i.e., incoming messages) which tests the image's ability to 
give its holder relevant and useful data. Having delivered relevant and 
useful information, an image verifies itself. If it fails to deal with 
reality, the image is open to challenge and change. *' In this sense, 
much depends on the image's ability to be tested. An easily tested 
image will be a flexible one, open to challenge and change as "reality" 
warrants such adjustments. But as Boulding notes, not all images 
are easily tested and some might even be impossible to verify. 4 3  In 
such cases we can talk of inflexible images. 
We can espect some degree of inflexibility in all images. A com- 
pletely flexible image would, in fact, be no image at all. Similarly, some 
degree of flexibility would be necessary if an image were to be of any 
use to its holder. There remains a wide range between the poles of 
this flexibility-inflexibility continuum within which any particular image 
can be located. That location constitutes an important factor in deter- 
mining an image's utility for its holder or those who depend on that 
holder. It is in light of that contention that we will examine the 
planner's image. 
In order to further facilitate this analysis, we will view the image 
itself as characterized by four basic qualities. First, images have 
content; that is, an abstract and theoretical portion which negatively 
relates to alternative abstractions and theories. Each image contains 
values which reflect a choice among various value alternatives. Planner 
experts have a considerable number of views about desirable societal 
forms to choose from, and in making their choice and assigning it as 
their selected value they have given content to their image, i.e., they 
have adopted a particular bias which is then used by the planning 
system. The question of image flexibility in regard to its content should 
be viewed in terms of the extent to which a particular bias is held. The 
greater the bias toward one particular view of a "desirable7' societal 
form for the subject society, the more inflexible the image. 
A second quality of an image is its internal consistency - its struc- 
tural logic. We can attribute to images the same tendency Leon 
Festinger attributes to their holders, i.e., the drive for consonancy and 
congruity in the cognitive realm. " Images are organized entities that 
are continually exposed through the testing process to entropic forces 
which seek to disorganize structured patterns. " To ward off such 
forces, images continual.ly strive for an internal logic which can with- 
stand dissonance-creating pressures. This logic, to be effective for the 
image, must be "open" enough to permit the empirical realities of the 
4'Sec. Kenneth E. Boulding. "\'crifiahility c~f Economic Images," in The Structure 
of Economic Scic,t~cr, cd.  Shr~inoit  K ~ r r p p  (Englewood Cliff$, N . J . :  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1966), pp. 129-130. 
4 3  Zhid., I). 132. 
44 See Festinger. 
Boiilding, Thc Imngt,, p. 19: see also Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human 
Bemgs:  Ci/hrrnetics and Sor~ctr ,  (Vew York: Avon Books, 1954), Chapter I 
environment some role in determining the image's form. Here again 
we see the need for a mixture of flexibility and inflexibility* The image 
of planner experts must contain a structucal logic "closed" enough to 
give it a relatively persistent form and internal consistency while at the 
same time being sufficiently "open" to allow for adjustments of the 
structural logic to variations in environmental conditions. 
A third quality of an image is its strategical logic. This character- 
istic reflects an image's perception of the means by which it is to be 
applied in given situations. As with structural logic, strategical logic 
can be either open or closed. A "closed" strategical logic is necessary 
to the extent that it instructs the holder in definitive terms about what 
must be done and how. Yet, such specificity also breeds excessive inflexi- 
" bility. Strategies must also be open" and flexible in light of the 
realities of environmental variations. Thus, planner experts must have 
a strategical logic which helps them direct h e  application of their ex- 
pertise while leaving the door open to adjustments in methods mandated 
by unique or changing circumstances. 
Finally, an image is characterized by its adaptability, i.e., its 
capacity to relate to specific environmental conditions that are relevant 
for the image holder's purposes. An image which relates to one set of 
conditions is useful only when faced with that set or a closely related 
set. This is a sign of an unhealthy inflexibility which should be avoided, 
especially in a changing environment. On the other hand, one finds 
images which are so adaptabte that they lose all value for their holders. 
Completely adaptable images will lack the capacity to select certain 
features of the environment as keys to bring about specific changes. 
Such images, in a sense, would lack any guiding logic - structural or 
strategic. 
It is in this last reference that we can perceive the interrelatedness 
of all four qualities of the image. '" The planner expert's image will' be 
relevant and useful where its content is adaptable to the environmental 
conditions of the subject society. This -adaptability facilitates the 
application of the image which, in turn, is controlled by its content and 
structural logic. This system of mutual determinism, based on a 
"hierarchy of control and facilitationv" (see Figure 1), indicates 
several points at  which the planner experts and their value system can 
cause planning failure. 
The empirical evidence useful for an analysis of planner expert 
images is so little as to be almost non-existent. The present writer re- 
cently undertook a limited analysis of planner images based on this 
model, and the results of that study will be used here where applicable. 
Content bias. A thematic co~itent analysis of introductory chapters 
to thirty national development plans (including six each from five 
4 H  This view of the interrelatedness of four coniponents of the image was developed 
with the help of James R. Scarritt. 
4' See Talcott Parsons, Societies: Euolr~tionary and Compa~at ive  Perspectices (Engle- 
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1966), p. 9. 
Structural Levels 
Figure 1 
THE PLANNER'S IMAGE 
regions) 4 n  revealed very little in terms of the type of society advocated 
by planner experts. The analysis sought to determine the number of 
references these documents made to atomistic Gesel2schaft social systems 
as desirable objectives, as opposed to the more organistic Gemeinschaft 
TABLE 1 
THEMES OF PLANNING: CONTENT BIASES 
Anglophone / Francophone / 
Eastern Central Asia/ Latin Middle East/ All 
Africa Africa Pacific America Asia Minor Regions 
N= 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Gemeinschaft 
%= 2.7 0 0 0 0 0.6 
N= 7 4 4 4 1 20 
Gesellschaft 
%= 3.8 2.9 2.9 2.2 0.5 2.4 
N= 172 132 135 175 187 801 
Not Ascertainable 
%= 93.5 97.1 97.1 97.8 99.5 97.0 
For a listing of the sources used for this analysis, see Appendix A. 
societal forms. The results of this attempt, as shown in Table 1, in- 
dicate only a minor preference for Gesellschaft forms out of a total of 
826 cases, ' b i t h  thk content being "not ascertainable" in almost all 
cases. The same pattern held true for all cases even when considered 
on a regional basis. 
The lack of any indication of preference in this area can be inter- 
preted in two ways. First, we can hold that there was no preference. 
Such a conclusion cannot stand, however, in light of the fact that 
development planners deal constantly with the question of changing 
societies. They are commissioned for the purpose of converting one 
societal condition into another; thus, it would seem absurd for them to 
disavow any preference in societal form. 
A second interpretation would hold that the lack of a stated pre- 
ference for societal form is actually an indication that such a preference 
is widely held and perhaps taken for granted. If clarification of the 
content analysis is sought in other studies, this interpretation seems to 
stand up. For instance, a study by Warren Ilchman and others involv- 
ing interviews with 33 "middle range planners" indicated a strong 
desire for social relationships closely associated with Gesellschaft-type 
society: individualism, materialism, capitalism, and other attributes 
common to modern Western society. The interviewees reacted nega- 
tively to "traditional values" and "ascriptive" attitudes which they per- 
ceived as constraints to development planning - another indication of 
a pro-Gesellschaft view. When asked to citk countries they see as 
'6 
models" of development, their choices were basically oriented toward 
modern, Westernized examples like Japan, the United' States, and 
Western Europe. The Gesellschaft bias was clearly evident. " Any 
perusal of the general literature of planning will indicate the same 
strong bias. 
Structzlral logic. The same thematic content analysis attempted 
to uncover the orientation of ~ l anne r s  toward development by determin- 
ing which functional social subsystem was held to be most crucial for 
purposes of attaining desired ends. Using a Parsonian framework, we 
can attempt to determine which functional component among four 
primary social subsystems acts as the focus of the image's structural 
logic: the cultural or pattern maintenance subsystem; the social stratifi- 
cation or integrative subsystem: the political or goal attainment sub- 
system; the economic or ada~tat ive subsystem. By determining which 
of these components is the dominant theme among the 826 "plan objec- 
tives," we can accoinplish a dual task: first, it would indicate the opera- 
tional direction of the content bias; and second, it would offer the analyst 
" A "case" in the study was dpfined as a "plan objective" which was "a somewhat 
coherent and complete statement regarding the goals being sought by the statement's 
authors." 
See Warren Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip K.  Iiastings, The New Men 
of Knowledge and the Dcoeloping Nations: Planners and the Polity; A Preliminary 
Survey (Berkeley: Institute of Governrllental Studies, University of California, 1968). 
some insight into the specific form of the structural logic. It  would fol- 
low that if development planners would concentrate on economic policies 
(which they obviously do ) ,  then the planner expert's image is based on 
economic theories and models. An in-depth review of the literature of 
development planning supports this finding and also gives us some in- 
sight into the structural logic of the image itself. An economic deter- 
minism seems to permeate the image with considerable weight given to 
economic growth as the key to attaining "modernity." Among planner 
experts there exists a substantive controversy relating to which specific 
economic factor is the primtun mobile for development, but overall 
there is little debate regarding the primacy of economic variables them- 
selves. In fact, the structural logic involved in these theories is basically 
a closed and inflexible one which tends to deny the relevance of vari- 
ables which do not "fit" into its general economic framework. " The 
TABLE 2 
THEMES OF PLANNING: STRUCTURAL LOGIC 
Anglopllone ! Francophone /' 
Eastern Central Asia/ Latin Middle East/ All 
Africa Africa Pacific America Asia Minor Regions 
NI 121 107 103 127 124 582 
Adaptation 
% = 65.8 78.7 74.1 70.9 66.0 70.5 
N= 9 13 6 9 13 50 
Goal Attainment 
%= 4.9 9.6 4.3 5.0 6.9 6.1 
N= 50 14 29 36 42 171 
Integration 
%= 27.2 10.3 20.9 20.1 22.3 20.7 
- - - 
N= 0 2 1 3 9 15 
Pattern Maintenance 
%= 0 1.5 0.7 1.7 4.8 1.8 
- - - - 
N= 4 0 0 4 0 8 
Not Ascertainable 
%= 2.2 0 0 2.2 0 1 .o 
51  For a discussion specifically related to the closed nature of economic development 
logic, see Melvin Jay Duhnick, "The Planner's Image: The Impact of Expertise on 
Development Planning and Policymaking," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Colorado, 1974. 
results are reflected' in development studies that fail to take advantage 
of alternative models and apEroaches," thus limiting the applicability 
of such studies and the official plans which build upon them. 
Strategical logic. The strategv orientation of planner experts is an 
extension of the structural logic with an add'ed emphasis on eliminating 
perceived constraints. Strategy in development plans heavily em- 
phasizing the adaptation subsystem will, of course, concern itself prima- 
rily with the manipulation of economic factors. Planning documents 
are, in inany cases, little more than statements about the adjustment of 
key production factors (land, kabor, capital, technology, etc.) . As 
shown in Table 2, rarely does one come across strategies related to the 
political subsystem or the stratification (integrative) subsystem of the 
subject society. Even less frequent are references to the need for 
modifying'the cultural subsystem as a means for bringing about develop- 
ment objectives. Such tendencies are continually reinforced by the 
historical traditions of the development planners which seem to equate 
all planning with economic planning,"' and the pressures of a profes- 
sionalism which define theories and models that planners should follow 
if they are to be accepted by their professional peers. '" These deter- 
minants of strategy are thus related more to factors outside the truly 
relevant environment (that is, the subject society) than they are to those 
in that environment. The result is a high degree of strategical logic 
inflexibility in the image of planner experts. 
An indication of this inflexibility was uncovered in the thematic 
content analysis. For each of the 826 plan objectives found in the 
thirty plans, this writer sought to determine the strategic orientation 
advocated vis-a-vis current conditions in the subject society. The point 
of such an investigation was to find some measure of the extent to 
which planning images promote strategic flexibility. Such flexibility 
would be indicated by strategies which oriented to specific conditions 
on the basis of their individual utility for achieving given plan objec- 
tives. Inflexibility would manifest itself as strategies which failed to 
consider individual utilities and instead perceived all current conditions 
as either useful or not solely on the basis of their identification with 
the present state of "underdevelopment." The strategic choices in- 
volved either the ntaintenance of current conditions, thereby implying 
their possible use in the development plan; or the change of such con- 
ditions, implying that their elimination would best facilitate develop- 
ment efforts, 
The results, shown in Table 3, point to the overwhelming con- 
centration on eliminating rather than utilizing given subject society 
conditions; on imposing a new social system rather than modifying the 
old one to contemporary conditions. The most desirable stance in 
5 2  Apthorpe, 4-5. 
5 3  See Dubnick, pp. 188-205. 
" 'bid., pp. 206-214. 
TABLE 3 
THEMES OF PLANNING: STRATEGIC LOGIC 
Anglophone/ Francophone / 
Eastern Central Asia/ Latin Middle East/ All 
Africa Africa Pacific America Asia h2linor Regions 
N= 9 0 5 5 2 2 1 
Maintenance 
%= 4.9 0 3.6 2.8 1.1 2.5 
N= 143 136 134 163 186 762 
Change 
%= 77.7 100.0 96.4 91.1 98.9 92.3 
N= 32 0 0 11 0 43 
Not Ascertainable 
%= 17.4 0 0 6.1 0 5.2 
reference to this particular strategic question would be one which calls 
for the evaluation of current subject society conditions in terms of their 
potential utility for development planning efforts. The evidence, how- 
,ever, indicates a tendency for planner experts to assume condition- 
change to be of greater value. This reflects a considerable inflexibility 
in the image of planner experts. 
Adaptability. The adaptability of planner expert images is very 
difficult to analyze. Some indication was obtained in the previously 
mentioned study when this writer attempted to uncover what relation- 
ship there was, if any, between the freiuency of the planning themes 
found during the content analysis and the environmental. conditions of 
the 30 countries whose development plans were used. '"hat analysis, 
involving six categories of en~ i ronmin ta l l~  relevant factors (physical 
and demographic factors, political structure and process factors, political 
conflict factors, economic variables, social factors, and transport/com- 
munications variables), indicated little if any association between en- 
vironmental conditions and planning themes. Using Goodman and 
Kruskal's tau beta as a measure, associations were determined between 
the frequency of planning themes and variables derived from Arthur S. 
Banks' Cross ~ o k t z j  Time Series Data. " The results, displayed in 
Tables 4 through 9, reflect low levels of association between the 
frequency of planning themes and the forty-eight variables used to 
represent environmental variations among the thirty countries exam- 
ined. '' While it is impossible to draw general conclusions from such 
limited evidence, the implication of the study is obvious: planner 
expert images tend not to adapt to given environmental conditions. 
j5 For a discussion of the methods and measures used, ibid., pp. 102-114. 
- - 
5'jArthur S.  Banks, Cross-Polity Time Series Data (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1971 ) .  
j 7 S e e  Dubnick, pp. 175-187 and Appendix C (pp. 289-3321 
TABLE 4 
ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 





Factors hlaintenance I Gemeinschaft I Pattern 
1966 Change Gesellschaft hl aintenance 
Area 0.957 .0381 .0246 
Population .0631 .0320 .0338 
Population Density .0267 .0086 .0010 
Population in Cities of 
100,000 (Per Capita) .0384 .0041 .0119 
TABLE 5 
ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
AND PROCESS FACTORS AND THE THEMES 





Factors Maintenance / Genleinschaft / Pattern 
1966 Change Gesellschaft Maintenance 
Regime Type 
Head of State 
Effective 
Executive Type 











ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT FACTORS 
A N D  THE THEhlES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 




Goal Attainment / 
Environment Integration/ 
Factors hlaintenance / Gemeinschaft/ Pattern 
1964-1966 Change Gesellschaft Maintenance 
No. of Coups .0093 
No. of h4ajor 
Constitutional Changes .0212 
No. of Major 
Cabinet Changes .0244 
No. of Changes in 
Effective Executive .0084 
No. of Legislative 
Elections .0142 
No. of Assassinations ,0112 
No, of General Strikes .0406 
No. of Government 
Crises .0278 
No. of Political 
Purges .0440 
No. of Anti-Government 
Demonstrations ,0853 
TABLE 7 
ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AND 





Factors Xlaintc.n;uncc/ Genleinschnft/ Pattern 
1968 Clj:~ngc Gesellschaft blaintennnce 
Gross National 
Product I GNP) 
Per Capita 
Gross Domestic 
Product ( GDP) 
Per Capita 







Imports Per Capita 




ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL FACTORS AND 





- - . - 
Primary Scliool 
Enrollment Per Capita .l019 
Secondary School 
Enrollment Per Capita .03,50 
University 
Enrollment Per Capita .0379 
Total School 
Enrollmeilt Per Capita .073Y 
Perccn tage of 
Popu1'1tion Literate ,0616 







ASSOCIATION OF TRANSPORT/COhI\/lhIUNJCATIONS FACTORS 










Per Capita ,0366 
Cornmei.cia1 Vehicles 
Per Capita .0394 
All Highway 
Vehicles Per C;\pita .Ot309 
Telegrams Per Capita .0419 
Telel~hones Per Capita .0380 
Radios Per Capita .0400 
Ncwsl~aper Circul a t '  ion 
Per Capita .(I422 ,0270 
Book Prod. By Titles 
Per Millioil Pol~ulntion .(I322 .0045 








Wllile much more in\.cstig;\tio~~ is needed in this area, the data 
l)resenterl here i~lclicute that l)\anners themselvc~s ma); be as much to 
blame for developrneilt pl:11l faillire as the subject society or the inter- 
i~iitional social system. Their ge~le~.al  irnrnu~rity from hlurne in the past 
derives from a nu~nber  of sorlrces inclutling our reverence for the "pro- 
ft.ssiona1" ( the  "exl7cl.t" ill ;I tec.hllica1 field) and a11 inter~lationnl ver- 
sion of tll;~t ideology wliich 1)l;unes tllc victim. 12:hile toted fault for  
dcvelopi~~c~nt pl-ogl-;lh f'ai1ul.c canllot Ile placed on tlle I~lanncr experts 
alol~e. ollc must consider their image illflesi1)ility :I l~otential source of 
1)olic.v pro1)lems. 
APPENDIX A 
Specific details concerlling the selection of sources for the content 
ar~alysis, the procedure used, the results of the reliability test of 
those lxocedures, and a "read-out" of the data are given in Chapters 11, 
111, and Appendix ,4 of Melvin Jay Dubnick, "The Planner's Image: 
'The 1mp;ict of Expertise on Development Planning and Policymaking," 
unpublished P11.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974. In the 
present appendix some brief notes about the sources arid the reason for 
their selection are in order. 
The goal of this study was to try to uncover some of the "themes" 
which marked the planner's image. The most obvious document to 
esplore for these themes is the national development plan itself which, 
one assumes, is mainly the product of a planning organization headed 
and directed by planners. However, there are dangers in 
selecting this document. For example, it may not be drawn up by the 
planiiers, but by propagandists who communicate more rhetoric 
tharl they do planning proposals. Some of the documents may also 
suffer from being dra~vn up by planners who write what they think 
their politicid clientele and others (i.e., administrators, World Bank, etc.) 
wished to heill-, rather than what they held to be valid for planning 
purposes. Both of these dangers are somewhat magnified for this study 
since only orlc chapter from each document was examined - a chapter 
more suscel~tible t o  propngiu~dizing and false statements than any other 
since it was a reflection of non-technical objectives intended for the 
general public's reading. This particului- chapter, however, was the only 
one common to the thirty plans used in this stady. More importantlG, 
it is the ch~ipter concerned with the statement of planning priorities 
and objectives. These "ohjectives" cllapters are usually found at the 
begirlili~lg of each document and sometimes include a brief statement 
itbout the successes or fililures of past policies. The typical objectives 
chapter then goes on to summarize the proposed r>lan and the techniques 
being advocated. The length of those exilminLd for this study varied 
from two or three pages to 50 or 60 rmges. 
The unit of itnalysis was a "plan .)bjectiveV that this writer defined 
as a somewhat coherent and compkte statement regarding the goals 
sought by the statement's author(-. Some of these statements were 
sei~tenccs, others were paragraphs. For each plan objective, three 
questions werc :~sked: first, toward \vhat societal form was the ob- 
jective aimed; second, was thc o1)iectivc. oriented toward the mainten- 
ance or change of the structures of the present system; and third, what 
function;ll portion of the social systerl~ tlid the objective attempt to 
influerlce? The ar~snrers to these cluestions determined where the ob- 
jectivc was classified ill a three-dimensional sche~ne. The only addition 
W;IS ;1  lot ascertainilblc" category added to e;ic.ll of the dimensions. 
The results provided the data for the preserlt studv. 
Selecting the. l~Ians for analvsis was perllaps the most difficult 
problem. This sort of analvsis s1;ould 1,e Lased on a sample derived 
randomlv from an et~tirc population of national clevelopment plans. 
The only other valid alternative might be a weighted sample whose com- 
position is calculated to control for certain factors. Neither method 
could be used in the present study due to the limited availability of 
the documents and of financial resources which might have facilitated 
the effort. After considering what plans were available, it was decided 
that an attempt should be made to at least disperse the sample into 
five distinct region;al categories based on geographic and/or language 
criteria. Thus, while the following discussion will treat this analysis as 
if it were accomplished' with a scientifically acceptable random or 
weighted sample, the reader should keep in mind that this is not the 
case. One should consider this study as an example of how such an 
analysis could be done if sufficient materials were available. All con- 
clusions must be evaluated with this caveat in mind. 
Thirty countries were chosen for the study, six each from five 
geographic and/or language region areas. They are as follows: 
- Anglophone and Eastern Africa (Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia) ; 
- Francophone and Central Africa (Burundi, Central African 
Kepubl.ic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Togo); 
- Asia/Pacific (Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Nepal, 
Thailand) ; 
- Latin America (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Guatemala, Para- 
guay, Peru) ; 
- Middle East and Asia Minor (Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Turkey). 
For each of these countries, a relatively recent plan document was 
obtained dating from about the mid-1960's. The specific documents and 
chapters used were as follows: 
Republic of Botswana. National Development Plan 1968-73. Ga- 
berones, 1968, Chapter 11. 
Imperial Ethiopian Government, The Planning Commission. Third 
Five-Year Derjelopment Plan 1961 -1 965 E. C. (1 968-1 973). Addis 
Abilba, 1961 ( 1968),  Chapter I. 
Republic of Kenya, Ministry for Economic Planning and Development. 
Development Plan 1970-1972, n.p., n.d., Chapter 1. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Second National Development Plan 1970- 
74. Lagos, 1970, Chapter 4. 
Tanzania. Second Pitie-Yeur Plan for Economic and Social Dcvclop- 
ment 1 st July 1969 - 30th June 1974. Dar Es Salaam, 1970, 
Volume I, Chapter 1. 
Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Dcvelopmellt Planning and National 
Guidance. Seconct National Deuclopment Plan January 1972 - 
Decenzbcr 2!9')76. Lusaka, 1971, pp. 33-36. 
Republique du Uurundi. Plan Qttinyrlennal de DSvelopl~ment Econ- 
omiyue et Social dtl B~rrundi 1968-1972. n.p., n.d., pp. 9-22. 
Republique Centraficaine. Plan de Ddveloppment Economique e t  Socinl 
1967-1970. n.p., n.d., Titre 11. 
Kelxlblique du Tchad. Ministi.re du Plan et,de la Cooperation. Premier 
Plan ()rcinqrtennal de  Dkvelopn~ent Econornique ct Social 1966- 
1970. n.p.,n.d., pp. 5-8. 
Republic du Dahomey. Plan de  Dk~elappment  Economiyue et Social 
1966-1970. n.p., n.d., Chapter 11. 
Republicjue Gabonaise. Plun de Dbucloppment Econonliyue et Social 
196'6-1970. n.p., n.d., Chapter 11. 
Hepublique Togolaise, hlinist&re des Finances, de 1'Economie et du Plan. 
Plan de DRoeloppment Economiqrle e t  Social 1971 -1 975. Lome, 
11.d., Section 11. 
Government of Ceylon, Ministry of Planning and Employment. The 
Five Year Plan 1972-1976. Colomno, 1971, Chapter 1. 
Goverrlmeilt of India, Pldnning Commission. Fourtlz Five Year Plan 
1969-1974, Draft. n.p., n.d., Chapter 1. 
Republic of Indonesia. The First Pice-Year Development Plan (1969/ 
70-1973-74). n.p., n.d., Chapter I .  
Government of the Republic of Korea, Economic Plnnning Board. The 
Tllird Fice-Year Economic De~e lopmen f  Plan 1972-1976. n.p., 
1971, Chapter I. 
Nepal, Nation'il Planning Commission. Fotirth Plun (1 970-1 975). 
Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, 1972, Chapter I .  
Government of Th'iiland, National Economic Development Board. The  
Second National Econolilic and Social Development Plan (1967- 
1971). Bankok, n.d., Chapter 111. 
Rel1iiblica Arge~ltinii, Presidencia de la Nacion, Secretaries del Consejo 
N;icional de Desarrollo y Del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad. Plan 
N~cionul  dc. Dcsarrollo y Seg~~ridud 1971 -1975. n.p., 1971, pp. 
17-19. 
Barbados. Deuelopnzent Plan 1969-1973, nap., n.d., Chapter 111. 
Federative Republic of Brazil. First National Development Plun 1972/ 
74, n.p., 1971, Chapter I. 
Guatemala, Secretaria General del Consejo Nacionnl de Planificacion 
Economics. Plan dc Desnrrollo 1971 -1 975, n.p., 1970, Tomo I, 
Seccion Primera, Capitulo I. 
Paraguay, Presidencia de la Repi~lica, Secretaria Tkcnica de Planifica- 
cion. Plan Nacioilal de Dc.sarroElo Economic y Sociul 1971 -1985: 
Sintesi.~ ctcl Pl(zn Gcncral y Sectorial. n.p., 1970, pp. 10-17. 
Repi~blica Pel-uiana, Presiclencia de la Hepilblica. plan Nacianal de  
Desarrollo Pum 1971-1975: Vol.un~e I, Plan Global. n.p., 1971, 
Capitulo I. 
Hoy~ll Governme~lt of Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning. An English 
Trr~i~skation of the Tliird Fiuc Year Economic and Solcia1 Plan of 
,4fghanistan 1967-1977. n.p., 1967; pp. 25-39. 
Iraq. Law No. 70 of 1970: Tlre National De~e lopment  Plan for the  
Fiscal Years 1970-1974. n.p., n.d., pp. 149-151. 
Kingdom of Pllorocco, Prime Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Planning and the Training of Senior Grades. Fi.ve Year Plan 1968- 
1972. n.p., n.d., \'olun~e I ,  Section 11, Chapter I. 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Planning. The Five 
Year' Plan of Sociul and Economic Deoeloprnent of the Democratic 
Republic of the Stdun  for the Period 1970/71 - 1974-75, Volume I: 
Major Tre,nds of De~elopment.  Khartoum, 1970, Chapter 11. 
Rkpublique Tunisienne, Secretariat d'Etat au Plan et 1'Economic Na- 
ionale. Plan Qzladriennal 1965-1968. Tunis, n .d., pp. 11-21. 
Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Planning Organization. 
Second ~ i o e - ~ d a r  Development Plan 1968-1 972. Ankara, 1969, 
pp. 3-5. 
Analyzing the content of the plan objectives of these plans is an 
extremely subjective process. Unlike content analyses where one seeks 
to account for the recurrence of certain words, phrases, or subjects, a 
thematic analysis relies to :I large extent upon [he meanings each in- 
dividual cbdifier attaches to the concepts being used. It  is, therefore, 
important to note the reliability of one's codification methods. For the 
present study, only the writer accomplished the primary analysis; three 
other individuals were asked to take part in a secondary analysis as a 
reliability test of that first attempt. A brief discussioil of the test's 
results will give the reader some basis for evaluating them. 
The three codifiers each had different academic backgrounds and 
different degrees of exposure to the arguments of this study. One, 
a graduate student in the humanities, was familiar with earlier versions of 
this dissertation and the reasoning behind the content an:~lysis. A second' 
codifier for this test was ;I political science graduate student whose main 
area was comparative politics. He had been involved in several dis- 
cussions about the present study, but was otherwise unfamiliar with the 
arguments in this work. The third codifier was also a political scientist. 
His main concern in the study of ~ol i t ics  was political thought and 
American government. He was not involved in any discussions regard- 
ing the present study. 
The reliability test was given in two parts. Part one tested the 
process used for selecting plan objectives f;)m the objectives chapters. 
The coefficients of  reliability for these threc codifiers were .730, .692, 
and .615 respectively - the individuals having more knowledge of the 
concepts scored higher than those with lesser kno\vledge. 
Part two of the reliability test consisted of giving each codifier 
specific sets of plan objectives'which the present writer had previously 
classified in terms of the three theme dimensions. Each codifier was 
then asked to classify that plan objective. Comparing the classifici~tions 
of this writer and those given by the codifiers, coefficients of reliability 
were calculated to be ,792, .fi93, and .594 with the individual having 
the greatest knowledge vis-a-vis the present work again coming out 
highest and the person with the lowest familiarity scoring the lowest 
co-efficient level. 
A familiarity with the concepts used in this analysis and the general. 
argument of the study did seemto have an impact upon the validity of 
the codification. This finding is not at all surprising in light of the 
subjective quality of the themcs under examination. I t  is difficult to 
determine whether this finding has a positive or negative meaning for 
the analysis. This is for the reader to judge. 
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